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1. Introduction 
 
The Costa Rica/Nicaragua case concerns a dispute with regard to navigational and related 
rights of Costa Rica on the San Juan River.1 This river runs approximately 205 km from Lake 
Nicaragua to the Caribbean Sea, and part of the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua 
runs long the right bank of the San Juan River.2 The section at issue in this dispute is the part 
of the river which runs from a point three English miles below a Nicaragua’s town, Castillo 
Viejo, to the mouth of the river at the Caribbean Sea.3  
 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua had both been under the rule of Spain, and they achieved their 
independence in 1821.4 After the war between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, the two countries 
concluded a Treaty of Limits on 26 April 1858 (hereafter the ‘1858 Treaty’ or ‘the Treaty’). 
The 1858 Treaty fixed the course of the boundary between Costa Rica and Nicaragua from 
the Pacific Ocean to the Caribbean Sea. At the same time, Article VI of the Treaty affirmed 
Costa Rica’s navigational rights ‘con objectos de comercio’ on the lower course of the San 
Juan River. Later, the validity of the 1858 Treaty was challenged by Nicaragua, and the 
Parties submitted the question to arbitration by the President of the United States. In his 
Award rendered on 22 March 1888, President Cleveland declared that the 1858 Treaty was 
valid; and that under Article VI of the Treaty, Costa Rica could navigate such vessels of the 
Revenue Service as may be connected to navigation ‘for the purposes of commerce’ on the 
San Juan River, although Costa Rica did not have the right of navigation with warships.5  
  
In the 1980s, various incidents commenced with regard to the navigational régime of the San 
Juan River because Nicaragua introduced certain restrictions on navigation on the river. On 
                                                 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law.  
 
1 Case Concerning the Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua). The text of 
the Judgment is available at the homepage of the ICJ <http://www.icj-cij.org>. The analysis of this contribution 
relies on the electronic version of the Judgment. The page numbers quoted in this contribution are the numbers 
of the electronic text. 
2 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 15, paras. 15-16. 
3 This section is some 140 km long. Id., p. 20, para. 30. 
4 Id., p. 15, para. 17. 
5 Id., p. 18, paras. 19-20. 
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30 July 1998, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defence and the Costa Rican Minister of Public 
Security signed the Cuadra-Lizano Joint Communiqué. This document allowed for Costa 
Rican armed police vessels to navigate on the river to re-supply their boundary posts on the 
Costa Rican side under certain conditions. On 11 August 1998, however, Nicaragua declared 
that this Communiqué was null and void. Costa Rica did not accept this unilateral declaration. 
Thus, disputes between the Parties persisted with regard to the navigational régime on the 
San Juan River.6   
 
On 29 September 2005, Costa Rica instituted proceedings against Nicaragua before the 
International Court of Justice (hereafter the ICJ or the Court) with regard to a dispute 
concerning navigational and related rights of Costa Rica on the San Juan River.7 Costa Rica 
founded the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ, the 2002 
Tovar-Caldera Agreement, and Article 31 of the ‘Pact of Bogotá’.8 Nicaragua did not object 
to the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain the case.9 As the Court included on the Bench no judge 
of the nationality of either of the disputing Parties, Costa Rica chose Mr. Antônio Cançando 
Trindade and Nicaragua Mr. Gilbert Guillaume as judges ad hoc. While Mr. Cançando 
Trindade was subsequently elected as a Member of the ICJ, Costa Rica did not choose a new 
judge ad hoc.10 Against this background, this contribution seeks to succinctly overview the 
Costa Rica/Nicaragua Judgment of 2009. 
 
2. The Extent of Costa Rica’s Right of Free Navigation on the San Juan River 
 
2.1. The meaning and scope of the phrase ‘libre navegación … con objetos de comercio’ 
 
Principal issues in the Costa Rica/Nicaragua dispute concern the extent of Costa Rica’s 
perpetual right of free navigation on the San Juan River and Nicaragua’s power to regulate 
navigation by Costa Rica. The Court commenced its examination with an analysis of the 
navigational right of Costa Rica on the San Juan River. According to the Court, the 1858 
Treaty is sufficient to settle the question of the extent of Costa Rica’s right of free 
navigation.11 The main provision which provides Costa Rica’s perpetual right of free 
navigation is Article VI of the 1858 Treaty. In this regard, a key issue relates to the 
interpretation of the phrase, ‘libre navegación …con objetos de comercio,’ in Article VI. The 
Parties considerably disagree over the meaning and scope of this phrase. 12 According to 
Nicaragua, the freedom of navigation set out in Article VI relates only to the transport of 
goods intended to be sold in a commercial exchange.13 However, Costa Rica argued that the 
freedom of navigation encompasses not only the transport of goods but also the transport of 
                                                 
6 Id., p. 19, paras. 24-26.  
7 Id., pp. 19-20, paras. 27-28. 
8 Id., p. 7, para. 1. 
9 Id., p. 20, para. 28. 
10 Id., p. 7, para. 4.  
11 Id., p. 21, para. 36.  
12 Id., p. 23, para. 42.  
13 Id., p. 24, para. 45; See also Counter-Memorial of Nicaragua, Vol. I, 29 May 2007, pp. 154-164, paras. 4.1.16-
4.1.45; Rejoinder of Nicaragua, Vol. I, 15 July 2008, pp. 99-157, paras. 3.1-3.99; presentation by Mr. Antonio 
Remiro Brotóns, CR 2009/4, pp. 35-49, para. 1-53 and CR 2009/7, pp. 15-20, paras. 7-30. 
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passengers, including tourists.14 In response to this question, the Court examined the term 
‘con objetos’ and ‘commerce’. respectively.  
 
First, concerning the meaning of the phrase ‘con objetos’, the Court considered that 
Nicaragua’s narrow interpretation, which defines this phrase as ‘with goods’ or ‘with 
articles’, cannot be upheld mainly because such interpretation renders meaningless the entire 
sentence in which the phrase appears in Article VI. By contrast, Costa Rica’s interpretation of 
the phrase allows the entire sentence to be given coherent meaning. Thus the Court upheld 
the interpretation of Costa Rica in this particular matter.15  
 
Second, with regard to the meaning of the word ‘commerce’, the Court supported neither the 
broad interpretation advocated by Costa Rica nor the narrow one put forward by Nicaragua. 
In this regard, the Court was of the view that the term ‘comercio’ must be understood to have 
the meaning it bears on each occasion on which the Treaty is to be applied (i.e. on a case by 
case basis); and that the present meaning, not the meaning in the mid-nineteenth century, 
must be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty. Accordingly, the Court found that the 
right of free navigation in question applies to the transport of persons as well as of goods, 
because the activity of transporting persons can nowadays be commercial in nature.16  
 
2.2. Private navigation 
 
On the basis of the above consideration, the Court examined the types of activities covered by 
the right of free navigation belonging to Costa Rica. Concerning private navigation, the Court 
was of the view that the right of free navigation set out in Article VI covers two types of 
navigation: (i) the navigation of vessels carrying goods intended for commercial transactions; 
and (ii) that of vessels carrying passengers who pay a price other than a token price in 
exchange for the service thus provided. In the second instance, the fact that the vessel’s 
owner receives payment for this activity is critical. 17  
 
In this regard, a question arose as to whether the navigation of vessels belonging to the 
inhabitants of the villages on the Costa Rican bank of the river in order to meet the basic 
requirements of everyday life was protected by the right of free navigation when carried out 
free of charge. In light of the historical background to the conclusion of the 1858 Treaty and 
of the Treaty’s object and purpose as defined by the Preamble and Article I, the Court took 
the view that the parties must be presumed to have intended to preserve for the Costa Ricans 
living on that bank a minimal right of navigation for the purposes of continuing to live a 
normal life in the villages along the river. Thus, the Court held that such a right can be 
                                                 
14 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 24, para. 45. See also Memorial of Costa Rica, Vol. 1, 29 August 2009, pp. 
53-72, paras. 4.17-4.72; Reply of Costa Rica, Vol. 1, 15 January 2008, pp. 55-70, paras. 3.39-3.78; presentation 
by Mr. Marcelo Kohen, Counsel of Costa Rica, CR 2009/2, pp. 47-69, paras. 1-75 and CR 2009/6, pp. 19-36, 
paras. 1-61. 
15 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, pp. 25-27, paras. 50-56. 
16 Id., pp. 27-31, paras. 57-71. 
17 Id., pp. 31-32, para. 73.  
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inferred from the provisions of the Treaty as a whole, in particular, the manner in which the 
boundary is fixed.18  
 
In conclusion, the Court unanimously found that: Costa Rica has the right of free navigation 
on the San Juan River for purposes of commerce; the right of navigation for purposes of 
commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica includes the transport of passengers; and the right of 
navigation for purposes of commerce enjoyed by Costa Rica includes the transport of tourists. 
Further, the Court found, by thirteen votes to one, that the inhabitants of the Costa Rican 
bank of the San Juan River have the right to navigate on the river between the riparian 
communities for the purposes of the essential needs of everyday life which require 
expeditious transportation.19 
 
2.3. The navigational right of official vessels 
 
In the Court’s view, it was not convinced that a right for Costa Rica to sail official vessels 
could be inferred from Article VI. Further, Costa Rica failed to prove its assertion that river 
transport is the only means to supply its police posts located along the river bank or to carry 
out the relief of the personnel stationed in them. Thus the Court unanimously found that 
Costa Rica does not have the right of navigation on the San Juan River with vessels carrying 
out police functions. It also found that Costa Rica does not have the right of navigation on the 
San Juan River for the purposes of the exchange of personnel of the police border posts along 
the right bank of the river and of the re-supply of these posts, with official equipment, 
including service arms and ammunition.20  
 
On the other hand, for the same reasons given in paragraphs 78 and 79 of its Judgment, the 
Court upheld the navigational right of certain Costa Rican official vessels which are used 
solely for the purpose of providing the population along the river with the necessities of daily 
life. According to the Court, this right is inferred from the provisions of the 1858 Treaty as a 
whole, in particular from the fixing of the boundary along the river bank.21 Hence the Court, 
by twelve votes to two, held that Costa Rica has the right of navigation on the San Juan River 
with official vessels, but only those used solely to provide essential services for the 
inhabitants of the riparian areas where expeditious transportation is a condition for meeting 
the inhabitants’ requirements.22  
 
3. Nicaragua’s Regulatory Power Concerning Navigation 
 
3.1. General consideration 
 
The Court held that Nicaragua has the power to regulate the exercise by Costa Rica of its 
right to freedom of navigation under the 1858 Treaty. However, that power is not unlimited 
and a regulation in the present case is to have the following characteristics: (1) non-
                                                 
18 Id., pp. 32-33, paras. 74-79. 
19 Id., pp. 52-53, para. 156 (1) (a) (b) (c) and (f). 
20 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (1) (h) and (i). 
21 Id., pp. 33-34, paras. 80-84.  
22 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (1) (g). 
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impediment of the right of free navigation, (2) conformity with the terms of the 1858 Treaty, 
(3) legitimate purposes, (4) non-discrimination, and (5) reasonableness.23  
The Court then addressed the question of whether Nicaragua has a legal obligation to notify 
Costa Rica of the measures to regulate navigation on the river. The 1858 Treaty lacks any 
specific provision in this matter. Considering three factors together, i.e., the 1956 Fournier-
Sevilla Agreement, practical necessities of navigation, and the nature of regulation, the Court 
concluded that Nicaragua is under an obligation to notify Costa Rica of the regulations 
concerning the navigational regime on the San Juan River. However it stated that that 
obligation does not extend to notice or consultation prior to the adoption by Nicaragua of 
such regulations.24 
 
3.2. The lawfulness of the specific measures of Nicaragua 
 
The next issue that needs to be examined concerns the lawfulness of Nicaragua’s measures, 
which has been disputed by Costa Rica. As will be seen below, although the ICJ admitted the 
lawfulness of the requirements relating to identity documents, departure clearance 
certificates, timetabling, and flags, the Court ruled that Nicaragua’s requirements of visas, 
tourist cards and charges are at variance with its obligation under the 1858 Treaty. 
 
3.2.1. Lawful measures of Nicaragua 
 
First, with regard to the requirement to stop and identification, Nicaragua, as a sovereign 
state, has the right to know the identity of those entering its territory and to know that they 
have left, and, thus, the requirement of having a passport was legitimate. To that extent, the 
Court held that the Nicaraguan requirement to stop vessels on entering and leaving the river 
is lawful. However, the Court did not support any legal justification for a general requirement 
that vessels continuing along the San Juan River stop at any intermediate point.25 Thus the 
Court found, unanimously, that Nicaragua has the right to require Costa Rican vessels and 
their passengers to stop at the first and last Nicaraguan post on their route along the San Juan 
River; and that Nicaragua has the right to require persons travelling on the San Juan River to 
carry a passport or an identity document.26 
 
Second, the Court ruled that the purposes invoked by Nicaragua requiring certificates, namely 
for navigational safety, environmental protection and criminal law enforcement, are 
legitimate ones. In the Court’s view, this requirement does not appear to have imposed any 
significant impediment on the exercise of Costa Rica’s freedom of navigation.27 Thus the 
Court found, unanimously, that Nicaragua has the right to issue departure clearance 
certificates to Costa Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation but does 
not have the right to request the payment of a charge for the issuance of such certificates.28 
                                                 
23 Id., p. 35, para. 87. 
24 Id., pp. 36-38, paras. 91-97. 
25 Id., pp. 39-40, paras. 103-107. 
26 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (2) (a) and (b). 
27 Id., pp. 40-41, paras. 108-110. 
28 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (2) (c). 
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Third, according to the 2001 Action Plan of the Army of Nicaragua for issuance of a 
Departure Clearance Certificate, Nicaragua suspended navigation over the San Juan River 
between 5.00 pm and 5.00 am for purposes of protecting human life and safe navigation. In 
this regard, the Court was of the view that the limited interference with Costa Rica’s freedom 
of navigation, namely Nicaragua’s time regulation, does not amount to an unlawful 
impediment to that freedom considering the purposes of the regulation.29 Hence the Court 
found, unanimously, that Nicaragua has the right to impose timetables for navigation on 
vessels navigating on the San Juan River.30 
 
Fourth, respecting the requirement of flying Nicaragua’s flag, the Court considered that 
Nicaragua may, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, require Costa Rican vessels 
navigating on the river to fly its flag. According to the Court, this requirement cannot be 
considered as an impediment to the exercise of the freedom of navigation of Costa Rican 
vessels under the 1858 Treaty. In fact, the Court found no evidence that Costa Rican vessels 
had been prevented from navigation on the San Juan River because of Nicaragua’s flag 
requirement.31 Thus the Court found, unanimously, that Nicaragua has the right to require 
Costa Rican vessels fitted with masts or turrets to display the Nicaraguan flag.32  
 
3.2.2. Unlawful measures of Nicaragua 
 
The legality of a visa requirement by Nicaragua is a debatable issue in the Costa 
Rica/Nicaragua dispute. Concerning this matter, the Court took the view that an imposition 
of the visa requirement denies that benefit, and consequently, is a breach of the 1858 Treaty 
right. The Court also ruled that Nicaragua may not require persons travelling on Costa Rican 
vessels exercising Costa Rica’s freedom of navigation on the river to purchase a tourist card 
because this is inconsistent with the right of freedom of navigation.33 Hence the Court found, 
by nine votes to five, that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican 
vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation are not required to obtain Nicaraguan 
visas; and that Nicaragua is not acting in accordance with its obligations under the 1858 
Treaty when it requires persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa Rican 
vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation to obtain Nicaraguan visas.34 Further, 
the Court found unanimously, that persons travelling on the San Juan River on board Costa 
Rican vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation are not required to purchase 
Nicaraguan tourist cards; and that Nicaragua is not acting in accordance with its obligation 
under the 1858 Treaty when it requires those persons to purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards.35 
 
Concerning charges or fees on Costa Rican vessels required by Nicaragua, the Court ruled 
that as Nicaragua has no legal power to require the issuing of visa and tourist cards, no charge 
or fee may be required.36 Further, the Court took the view that the charge for the departure 
                                                 
29 Id., pp. 45-46, paras. 125-129. 
30 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (2) (d). 
31 Id., pp. 46-47, paras. 130-132.  
32 Id., p. 54, para. 156 (2) (e).  
33 Id., pp. 41-43, paras. 111-119. 
34 Id., p. 53, para. 156 (1) (d) and p. 55, para. 156 (4) (a). 
35 Id., p. 53, para. 156 (1) (e) and p. 55, para. 156 (4) (b). 
36 Id., p. 43, para. 120. 
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clearance certificate for Costa Rican vessels exercising freedom of navigation on the river is 
unlawful.37 Hence the Court found, unanimously, that Nicaragua is not acting in accordance 
with the 1858 Treaty when it requires the operators of vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of 
free navigation to pay charges for departure clearance certificates. 38 
 
4. Subsistence Fishing 
 
Costa Rica requested the Court to declare that Nicaragua has the obligation to permit 
riparians of the Costa Rican bank to fish in the river for subsistence purposes. According to 
Costa Rica, subsistence fishing is a customary right.39  
 
Although the Parties agreed that the practice of subsistence fishing is long established, they 
disagree on whether the practice has become binding on Nicaragua as a matter of customary 
right. In this regard, the Court highlighted that the failure of Nicaragua to deny the existence 
of a right arising from the practice is particularly significant. Thus the Court found, by 
thirteen votes to one,  that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan 
River for subsistence purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as a customary 
right.40 That right would be subject to any Nicaraguan regulatory measures relating to fishing 
adopted particularly for the protection of resources and the environment. The customary right 
does not extend to fishing from vessels on the river.41 Finally, the Court unanimously rejected 
all other submissions presented by Costa Rica and Nicaragua.42 
 
5. Some Comments on the Costa Rica/Nicaragua Judgment  
 
Considering that the number of cases before the ICJ is still limited in the context of use and 
management of fresh waters, the Costa Rica/Nicaragua Judgment will provide an important 
precedent in this field. While detailed examination of each and every issue of this Judgment 
is beyond the scope of this contribution, three issues in particular must be highlighted.  
 
A first issue concerns the lawfulness of Nicaragua’s power to request visas. Five members of 
the Court objected to the majority opinion on this matter. For example, Judge Sepúlveda-
Amor argued that the reasoning of the Court did not provide any hard facts which could 
endorse the argument that Nicaragua’s requirement to obtain visas would prevent free 
navigation on the San Juan River.43 In this regard, the Court itself recognized that: ‘The 
power of a State to issue or refuse visas is a practical expression of the prerogative which 
each State has to control entry by non-nationals into its territory’.44 With respect, the Court 
                                                 
37 Id., p. 45, paras. 123-124. 
38 Id., p. 55, para. 156 (4) (c). 
39 Memorial of Costa Rica, supra note 14, pp. 89-90, paras. 4.124-4.128; Reply of Costa Rica, supra note 14, 
pp. 81-85, paras. 3.109-3.121. 
40 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 54, para. 156 (3). 
41 Id., p. 49, paras. 141-144. 
42 Id., p. 55, para. 156 (5). 
43 Separate Opinion of Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, id., pp. 2-3, paras. 8-16. See also Separate Opinion of Judge 
Skotnikov, id., pp. 3-4, paras. 15-18; Declaration of Judge ad hoc Guillaume, id., pp. 10-11, para. 21. 
44 Judgment, id., p. 42, para. 113. See also presentation by Mr. Paul Reichler, Counsel of Nicaragua, CR 2009/7, 
pp. 44-46, paras. 18-21. 
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should have explained in more detail in its Judgment why the requirement to obtain a visa 
from Nicaragua would hinder the freedom of navigation.45  
 
A second issue relates to the identification of local custom with regard to subsistence fishing. 
As we had seen, the Court concluded that Costa Rica has a customary right to subsistence 
fishing.  Nonetheless, the legal basis of local or bilateral custom on this subject would seem 
to leave some room for discussion.46 In this regard, it must be recalled that the ICJ, in the 
Asylum case, stated that: 
 
The Party which relies on a custom of this kind [local custom] must prove that this 
custom is established in such a manner that it has become binding on the other Party. The 
Colombian Government must prove that the rule invoked by it is in accordance with a 
constant and uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is the 
expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on 
the territorial State.47 
  
Following the dictum of the Asylum case, a question that needs to be addressed in the Costa 
Rica/Nicaragua case is whether there is ‘constant and uniform usage practised by the States’ 
with respect to Costa Rica’s right to subsistence fishing. In this regard, the Court stated that: 
  
[T]he practice, by its very nature, especially given the remoteness of the area and the 
small, thinly spread population, is not likely to be documented in any formal way in any 
official record.48  
 
This passage appears to suggest that there is no documented practice which could prove the 
existence of a customary right to subsistence fishing. It is also debatable that the practice of a 
local community of Costa Rican riparians can be equated with the practice of Costa Rica as a 
State.49 Hence there appears to be scope to reconsider the question whether ‘constant and 
uniform usage practised by the States’ exists in this matter.50 
  
Third, special attention must be paid to the evolutive interpretation of the 1858 Treaty. In this 
regard, the Court’s view bears quoting: 
 
                                                 
45 On this issue, see Memorial of Costa Rica, supra note 14, pp. 108-112, paras. 5.54-5.67; Reply of Costa Rica, 
supra note 14, pp. 159-162, paras. 4.12-4.18; presentation by Mr. Lucius Caflisch, Counsel of Costa Rica, CR 
2009/6, p. 48-49, paras. 37-40. 
46 The possibility of a bilateral custom was accepted by the ICJ in the Right of Passage case. ICJ Reports 1960, 
p. 39. Generally on this issue, see H. Thirlway, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1960-1989 Part Two, 61 BYIL 1, pp. 102-104 (1990); by the same writer, International Customary Law and 
Codification, pp. 135-143 (1972). 
47 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 276. 
48 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 49, para. 141. 
49 Separate Opinion of Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, id., p. 5, para. 26. Concerning the scope of the State practice in 
customary law making, see Thirlway, supra note 46 (International Customary Law and Codification) pp. 57-60; 
M. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BYIL 1, pp. 1-11 (1974-1975). 
50 Separate Opinion of Judge Sepúlveda-Amor, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 5, para. 28. See also Declaration of Judge 
ad hoc Guillaume, id., p. 11, para. 22. 
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 [W]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having 
been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the 
treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the 
parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an 
evolving meaning.51  
 
In the Court’s view, this is the case in respect of the term ‘comercio’ as used in Article VI of 
the 1858 Treaty.52 In so doing, the Court interpreted this provision in an evolutive manner. In 
this respect, it must be noted that the Court’s interpretation relies on ‘the Parties’ common 
intention at the time the treaty was concluded’.53  
 
As a good illustration in this matter, the Court referred to the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
Judgment.54 In this case, the Court interpreted the expression ‘the territorial status’ used in 
Greece’s reservation to the General Act of 1928 in an evolutive manner owing to a generic 
nature of the concept of territorial status and continuing duration of the General 
Act.55Although the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Judgment concerns the interpretation of a 
reservation to a treaty, the Court considered that its reasoning in that case can be fully 
transposable for purposes of interpreting the terms of a treaty themselves.56 In relation to this, 
it is also notable that under the 1858 Treaty, the Court admitted Nicaragua’s responsibilities 
concerning the environmental protection of the San Juan River because the interests which 
are to be protected through regulation was changed with the passage of time.57 Overall it 
would seem that the ICJ, in the Costa Rica/Nicaragua case, flexibly took time elements into 
account in the interpretation of the 1858 Treaty. 
 
The antithesis between stability and change is a fundamental issue of law, and the law of 
treaties is no exception. Here a question arises how it is possible to take account of a time 
element in the interpretation of a specific treaty in order to adapt treaty provisions to a new 
situation. In this respect, evolutive or dynamic treaty interpretation merits particular attention. 
58 In fact, the method of evolutive interpretation has been adopted by international courts 
                                                 
51 Judgment, id., p. 30, para. 66. See also p. 29, para. 64. See also presentation by Mr. Kohen, CR 2009/6, p. 35, 
para. 58.  
52 Judgment, id., p. 30, para. 67. On the other hand, Nicaragua opposed the application of evolutive 
interpretation to the 1858 Treaty. See in particular, presentation by Mr. Alain Pellet, CR 2009/4, pp. 49-55, 
paras. 3-12 and CR 2009/7, pp. 28-29, paras. 22-23. 
53 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 29, para. 64. However, Judge Skotnikov objected to the majority opinion in 
this particular matter. Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, id., p. 1, para. 5. 
54 Judgment, id., pp. 29-30, para. 65. See also presentation by Mr. Kohen, CR 2009/6, p. 35, para. 58.  
55 ICJ Reports 1978, p. 32, para. 77. With regard to the evolutive interpretation of Greece’s reservation in the 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, see T. O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AJIL 285, pp. 296-
302 (1980). 
56 Judgment, ICJ Reports 2009, p. 30, para. 66. 
57 Id., p. 36, para. 89; p. 39, para. 104. The environmental protection of rivers is increasingly important. 
Generally on this subject, see for instance, L. Caflisch, Règles Générales du droit des cours d’eau 
internationaux, 219 RCADI 9, pp. 163-185 (1989-VII); O. Mclntyre, Environmental Protection of International 
Watercourses under International Law (2007); S. C. McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, pp. 
446-462 (2007). 
58 On this issue, see M. Fitzmaurice, Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties: Part I, 21 Hague Yearbook 
of International Law 101 (2008). 
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particularly in relation to constituent instruments of international organisations59 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights.60  
 
On the other hand, some advocate the application of the principle of contemporaneity to the 
interpretation of treaties. According to this principle, the terms of a treaty must be interpreted 
according to the meaning which they possessed at the date when the treaty was originally 
concluded.61 It is argued that the principle of contemporaneity is a particular application of 
the doctrine of inter-temporal law.62 It is common knowledge that Judge Huber, in the 1928 
Island of Palmas case, formulated this doctrine as follows: ‘a juridical fact must be 
appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time 
when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled’.63 However, it must be noted that 
Judge Huber went on to state that: 
 
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods 
is to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be 
made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which 
subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands 
that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the 
conditions required by the evolution of law.64 
 
In so stating, Judge Huber took an evolutive element into account in the inter-temporal law 
doctrine. Thus, this doctrine would seem to be based on a view of international law as a 
dynamic legal system.65 The inter-linkage between the doctrine of inter-temporal law and the 
evolutive treaty interpretation will require further consideration.66 In any case, it appears that 
the Costa Rica/Nicaragua Judgment will provide an interesting example for discussion with 
regard to the evolutive interpretation of treaties in the future.   
 
                                                 
59 On this issue, see in particular, T. Sato, Evolving Constitutions of International Organizations: A Critical 
Analysis of the Interpretative Framework of the Constituent Instruments of International Organisations (1996). 
60 See for instance, R. Bernhardt, Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 42 GYIL 11 (2000); G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, pp. 58-79 (2007); Fitzmaurice, supra note 58, pp. 121-153. 
61 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, p. 346 and 359 (1993). 
62 Id., pp. 359-361. Concerning this doctrine, see for instance, Elias, supra note 55, pp. 285-307; N. Okuwaki, 
Evolutionary Process of International Norms and the Control of Time Factors in Legal Positivism, (in Japanese) 
22 Yearbook of World Law 70 (2003). With regard to time elements in treaty interpretation, see in particular, R. 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, pp. 250-298 (2008). 
63 Island of Palmas case (Netherlands, U.S.A.), United Nations, 2 Reports of International Arbitral Awards 845. 
64 Emphasis added. Id. 
65 Elias, supra note 55, p. 291. 
66 See for instance, Fitzmaurice, supra note 58, 102-113. 
